In this paper we study anonymous secret sharing schemes. Informally, in an anonymous secret sharing scheme the secret can be reconstructed without knowledge of which participants hold which shares. In such schemes the computation of the secret can be carried out by giving the shares to a black box that does not know the identities of the participants holding those shares. Phillips and Phillips gave necessary and su cient conditions for there to exist an anonymous secret sharing scheme where the size of the shares given to each participant is equal to the size of the secret. In this paper, we provide lower bounds on the size of the share sets in any (t; w) threshold scheme, and for an in nite class of non-threshold access structures. We also discuss constructions for anonymous secret sharing schemes, and apply them to access structures obtained from complete multipartite graphs.
Introduction
Informally, a secret sharing scheme is a method of distributing a secret key among a set of participants P in such a way that quali ed subsets of P can reconstruct the value of , whereas any other (non-quali ed) subsets of P cannot determine anything about the value of the . Secret sharing schemes are useful in any important action that requires the concurrence of several designated people to be initiated, such as launching a missile, opening a bank vault or even opening a safety deposit box. Secret sharing schemes are also used in management of cryptographic keys and multi-party secure protocols (see 12] for example).
The rst secret sharing schemes that were studied are (t; w) threshold schemes. A (t; w) threshold scheme allows a secret to be shared among w participants in such a way that any t of them can recover the secret, but any t?1 have absolutely no information on the secret. Shamir 21] and Blakley 2] showed how to construct (t; w) threshold schemes. Subsequently, Ito, Saito, and Nishizeki 14] and Benaloh and Leichter 1] described a more general method of secret sharing. They showed how to realize a secret sharing scheme for any monotone access structure. (An access structure is the family of all subsets of participants that are able to reconstruct the secret.)
The survey by Stinson 23] contains a uni ed description of results in the area of secret sharing schemes. For di erent approaches to the study of secret sharing schemes, including schemes with \extended capabilities" such as disenrollment, fault-tolerance, and pre-positioning, and a complete bibliography, we recommend the survey article by Simmons 22] .
An ideal secret sharing scheme is a scheme in which the size of the shares given to each participant is equal to the size of the secret. Brickell and Davenport 5] showed a correspondence between ideal secret sharing schemes and matroids (see also 15]) .
In this paper we analyze anonymous secret sharing schemes. Informally, in an anonymous secret sharing scheme the secret can be reconstructed without knowledge of which participants hold which shares. In such schemes the computation of the secret can be carried out by giving the shares to a black box that does not know the identities of the participants holding those shares. This would seem to be a desirable property in certain applications. For example, if the scheme is to be used to provide access to a secure area, then an anonymous scheme will provide security without the need for a separate identi cation protocol.
Anonymous secret sharing schemes were rst investigated in 1988 by Stinson and Vanstone 26] . In the model proposed in 26] the participants receive distinct shares (we will call such a scheme a \strict" anonymous scheme). The authors proved a lower bound on the size of the shares for anonymous threshold schemes and provided optimal schemes for certain classes of threshold structures by using a combinatorial characterization of optimal schemes. Further results can be found in 20] and in 9].
In 1992, Phillips and Phillips 18] considered a di erent model for anonymous secret sharing schemes. In their model, di erent participants are allowed to receive the same shares. They analyzed ideal anonymous secret sharing schemes, referred to in 18] as \strongly ideal schemes". Phillips and Phillips proved the interesting result that a strongly ideal scheme for an access structure ? on w participants can be realized if and only if ? is either a (1; w) threshold structure, a (w; w) threshold structure, or the closure of the edge set of a complete bipartite graph. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we give formal de nitions for various types of secret sharing schemes, and introduce some notation used in the paper. In Section 3 we provide a lower bound on the size of the share set (as a function of the size of the key set) in any anonymous (t; w) threshold scheme, and for an in nite class of non-threshold access structures. In Section 4 we consider strict anonymous secret sharing schemes. We prove a lower bound on the size of the share set for non-threshold access structures, generalizing the bound proved in 26]. In Section 5 we present some constructions for anonymous secret sharing schemes. In particular, we look at access structures which are the closure of the edge set of a complete multipartite graph, that is, access structures for which the set of participants can be identi ed with the vertex set V (G) of a graph G = (V (G); E(G)), and the subsets of participants quali ed to reconstruct the secret are only those containing an edge of G. (Non-anonymous secret sharing schemes for graph access structures have been extensively studied in several papers, such as 5, 6, 8, 4, 3, 24, 25] .)
De nitions and Notation
A perfect secret sharing scheme permits a secret to be shared among a set P of w participants in such a way that a quali ed subset of P can recover the secret, but any non-quali ed subset has absolutely no information on the secret. An access structure ? is the set of all subsets of P that can recover the secret. De nition 2.1 Let 0 ). An access structure ? will be called trivial if either ? = 2 P or ? = fPg (i.e., if every set is a quali ed set or if the only quali ed set is the entire set of participants P).
Let K be a set of q elements called secrets or keys, and let S be a nite set whose elements are called shares. Suppose a dealer D wants to share the secret key 2 K among the participants in P (we will assume that D 6 2 P). He does this by giving each participant P 2 P a share from S. The dealer can distribute the same shares to di erent participants, hence in the following we will use braces f g to denote sets and square brackets ] to denote multisets (a multiset is a set containing repeated elements).
We represent a secret sharing scheme by a collection of distribution rules. A distribution rule is a function f : P fDg ! K S which satis es the conditions f(D) 2 K and f(P i ) 2 S, for i = 1; 2; : : : ; w. A distribution rule f represents a possible distribution of shares to the participants, where f(D) is the secret key being shared, and f(P i ) is the share given to P i . If F is a family of distribution rules and 2 K, then F = ff 2 F : f(D) = g is the family of all distribution rules having as the secret. If 2 K is the value of the secret that D wants to share, then D will chose a distribution rule f 2 F uniformly at random, and use f to distribute shares to the participants.
Let fp K ( )g 2K be a probability distribution on K, and let a collection of distribution rules for secrets in K be xed. We de ne a perfect secret sharing scheme as follows. De nition 2.3 A perfect secret sharing scheme, with respect to the monotone access structure ? 2 P , is a collection of distribution rules that satisfy the following two properties: means that the probability that the secret is equal to , given that the shares held by A 6 2 ? and the identities of the participants in A are speci ed by a, is the same as the a priori probability of the secret . (From this it follows that for all a = f(P i ; s i ) : P i 2 Ag, there exists an integer a such that, for every 2 K, there exist exactly a distribution rules f 2 F such that f(P i ) = s i for all P i 2 A.) Therefore, no amount of knowledge of shares of participants not quali ed to reconstruct the secret enables a Bayesian opponent to modify an a priori guess regarding the secret. Throughout this paper, we con ne our attention to perfect schemes, so the term \secret sharing scheme" can be taken to mean \perfect secret sharing scheme".
A secret sharing scheme for which jKj = jSj is called an ideal secret sharing scheme and an access structure admitting an ideal scheme will be referred as ideal access structure.
We assume that the secret reconstruction phase is carried out by a trustworthy machine that keeps secret all the received shares. This is not a strong assumption and it is more or less explicitly used in all usual secret sharing schemes. In fact, if the machine does not keep the received shares secret, then everyone who has access to the machine would know all the shares and therefore could reconstruct the secret even if he is not allowed to.
In an anonymous secret sharing scheme the secret can be reconstructed without knowledge of which participants hold which shares. In such schemes the computation of the secret can be carried out by giving the shares to a trustworthy machine that does not know the identities of the participants holding those shares. The di erence between a secret sharing scheme and an anonymous secret sharing scheme depends on the reconstruction function used by the trustworthy machine.
We de ne an anonymous secret sharing scheme as follows.
De nition 2.4 An anonymous secret sharing scheme, with respect to the monotone access structure ? 2 P , is a collection of distribution rules which satis es Property 2. In this de nition, Property 1: means that to compute the secret it is enough to know just the shares held by participants in a quali ed set | it is not necessary to know the quali ed set or which participants hold which shares. Note that instead we could have used the following weaker security condition in the de nition of an anonymous scheme: for all s = s i : P i 2 A and s i 2 S] with p(s) > 0, and for all 2 K, it holds p( js) = p K ( ).
However, in this paper, we will restrict our attention to schemes that satisfy Property 2: since most known constructions produce schemes that satisfy this \stronger" condition. Moreover, it is generally better to use the strongest security condition in designing any cryptographic protocol.
Stinson and Vanstone 26] considered a model of anonymous secret sharing in which the participants receive distinct shares. We will refer to this model as a strict anonymous secret sharing scheme. A strict anonymous scheme can be considered as an anonymous scheme with an additional property.
We de ne a strict anonymous secret sharing scheme as follows.
De nition 2.5 A strict anonymous secret sharing scheme, with respect to the monotone access structure ? 2 P , is a collection of distribution rules which satis es Properties 1. and 2. of De nition 2.4, as well as the following property:
3 For any given secret key 2 K, the participants in P receive distinct shares. Formally, for all 2 K, for all s 2 S and for all P i ; P j 2 P, it holds p(P i = s; P j = sj ) = 0:
The following example illustrates the three di erent models of secret sharing for a particular access structure.
Example 2.1 Let ? 0 = ffP 1 P 2 g; fP 1 P 3 g; fP 2 P 3 gg be the basis of a (2; 3) threshold structure, ?, on the set of participants P = fP 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 g. We construct schemes for this access structure, in which the set S contains nine elements, for all three models. An ideal scheme
We can realize an ideal secret sharing scheme (i.e. one in which there are nine possible keys) for ? by using the technique of Shamir 21] . Let S = K = GF(9). For any secret key 2 K the family F of distribution rules will be constructed as F = f(f a (1); f a (2); f a (3)) : f a (x) = + ax; a 2 GF(9)g:
It is easy to see that the distribution rules thus obtained constitute an ideal secret sharing scheme for ?. There are 81 distribution rules, nine for each possible secret key.
An anonymous scheme
The following collection of distribution rules comprise an anonymous scheme for ?, in which there are ve possible keys. (This scheme is an application of a construction given in Section 5.) It is easy to check that we have an anonymous scheme for ?. Indeed, each pair of shares (x; y) 2 (Z 9 Z 9 ) belongs to only one F ; hence the secret key is uniquely determined from any two shares. In each F , each possible share is assigned to each possible participant by exactly one distribution rule. Hence the secret key remains completely unknown, given a single share and the identity of the participant holding it. There are 45 distribution rules, nine for each possible secret key.
A strict anonymous scheme The distribution rules in F 1 ; F 2 ; F 3 ; and F 4 comprise a strict anonymous scheme for ? 0 in which there are four possible keys. (This scheme is an application of a construction given in 26], and is optimal with respect to the size of the share set.) It is easy to check that these families of distribution rules realize an anonymous secret sharing scheme for ?. Indeed, each pair of (distinct) shares x; y 2 Z 9 belongs to only one F , hence the secret key is uniquely determined; but any single share is assigned to any particular participant by exactly one distribution rule in each F , so the secret key remains completely unknown. There are 36 distribution rules, nine for each possible secret key.
Terminology from Graph Theory and Design Theory
We rst present some basic terminology from graph theory. We consider only undirected graphs that do not have loops or multiple edges. If G is a graph, we denote the vertex set of G by V (G) and the edge set by E(G). In an undirected graph the pair of vertices representing any edge is unordered. Thus, the pairs (u; v) and (v; u) represent the same edge. A graph G is connected if any two vertices are joined by a path. The complete graph K n is the graph on n vertices in which any two vertices are joined by an edge. The complete multipartite graph K n 1 ;n 2 ;:::;nt is a graph on P t i=1 n i vertices, in which the vertex set is partitioned into subsets of size n i (1 i t) called parts, such that (v; w) is an edge if and only if v and w are in di erent parts. An alternative way to characterize a complete multipartite graph is to say that the complementary graph is a vertex-disjoint union of cliques. Note that the complete graph K n can be thought of as a complete multipartite graph with n parts of size 1. A stable set or independent set of G is a subset of vertices A V (G) such that no two vertices in A are joined by an edge in E(G). The stability number or independence number (G) is de ned to be the maximum cardinality of a stable set of G. A dominating set of a graph G is a set V 0 V (G) such that every vertex v 2 V (G) n V 0 is joined to at least one element of V 0 by an edge in E(G). Given a graph G, we can obtain an access structure ? based on G by computing the closure of the edge set E(G). Each edge in the graph determines two participants who can recover the secret. In this situation, we will identify ? 0 with the graph G.
We now present some basic terminology from design theory. A t-(v; k; ) design is a Results on resolvable S(2; k; v) for larger k can be found in 10].
Bounds on the Size of the Shares
The following theorem of Phillips and Phillips gives necessary and su cient conditions for an ideal anonymous secret sharing scheme to exist. Let ? be an access structure on a set of participants P. An ideal anonymous secret sharing scheme for ? exists if and only if either ? is a (1; jPj) threshold structure, a (jPj; jPj) threshold structure, or the closure of a complete bipartite graph.
Theorem 3.1 ( 18])
In the remainder of this section, we provide lower bounds on the size of the share set as a function of the size of the key set in any (t; w) threshold scheme (1 < t < w), and for an in nite class of non-threshold access structures. From Theorem 3.1, we know that jSj > jKj, but the bound we prove in this section is an asymptotic improvement. Theorem 3.2 Let ? be a (t; w) threshold structure with 1 < t < w. In any anonymous secret sharing scheme for ?, with secrets in K, the size of the share set S satis es jSj > (w ? t + 2) jKj ? 1 jKj ? 1 (jKj ? 1): Proof: Suppose the set of participants is P = fP i : 1 i wg. Let 
Denote by i (x) the average size of the blocks inÃ i containing x, and de ne
Now, we have X fÃ :x2Ãg
Then, we obtain the following: 1) q ? 1 (q ? 1); and the theorem is proved.
The bound of the previous theorem is non-trivial (i.e., we get jSj > jKj) when jKj 5.
The following theorem gives a lower bound on the size of the shares held by participants for an in nite class of non-threshold access structures.
Theorem 3.3 Let ? be an access structure on a set P of w participants. Suppose there exists a set B P such that B fP i g 6 2 ? for all P i 2 P n B, and B fP i ; P j g 2 ? for all fP i ; P j g P n B. Then, in any anonymous secret sharing scheme for ?, with key set K, the size of the share set S satis es jSj > (w ? jBj) jKj ? 1 jKj ? 1 (jKj ? 1): Proof: Let F denote the collection of distribution rules of the scheme. Choose any distribution rule f 0 2 F, and de ne F 0 = ff 2 F : f(P i ) = f 0 (P i ) for all P i 2 Bg: For any f 2 F 0 , de ne A f = f(P i ) : P i 2 PnB]:
Now repeat the remainder of the proof of Theorem 3.2, mutatis mutandis.
As an example, consider the access structure having basis ? 0 = ffP 1 ; P 3 ; P 4 g; fP 2 ; P 4 g; fP 1 ; P 2 gg: In this case we can take B = fP 3 g and the following corollary holds. Corollary 3.4 Let ? 0 = ffP 1 ; P 3 ; P 4 g; fP 2 ; P 4 g; fP 1 ; P 2 gg be the basis of an access structure on the set of participants P = fP 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 ; P 4 g. In any anonymous secret sharing scheme for ? with a key set of size q, the size of the share set S satis es jSj > 2q ? 5 + 3 q :
Strict Anonymous Schemes
In this section we consider a di erent model of anonymous secret sharing scheme, where we require that the participants receive distinct shares. We will refer to such a scheme as a strict anonymous secret sharing scheme. This model was rst investigated by Stinson For an information theoretic proof, see 7] .
Here, we prove a lower bound on the size of the share set for general access structures, which contains the previous bound as a special case. Theorem 4.2 Let ? be an access structure on a set P of w participants. Suppose that there exists a set B P such that jBj = r, B 6 2 ?, and B fP i g 2 ? for all P i 2 P n B. Then, in any strict anonymous secret sharing scheme for ? with key set K, the size of the share set S satis es jSj (w ? r)jKj + r: Proof: Let F denote the collection of distribution rules of the scheme. Choose any distribution rule f 0 2 F, and de ne F 0 = ff 2 F : f(P i ) = f 0 (P i ) for all P i 2 Bg:
For any f 2 F 0 , de ne A f = f(P i ) : P i 2 PnB]: In this way we get a collection A = A f : f 2 F 0 ] of (w ? r)?multisets of S, which we refer to as blocks. Partition this collection of blocks into q subcollections, A 1 ; : : : ; A q , determined by the corresponding keys for the distribution rules. Now, choose one set in each of these subcollections, say A i 2 A i for i = 1; 2; : : : ; q. Since the scheme for ? is a strict anonymous scheme, it is easy to see that the A i 's satisfy the following properties.
1. For i = 1; 2; : : : ; q, we have S \ A i = ;. 2. For i 6 = j, we have A i \A j = ; (for, if x 2 A i \A j , then there correspond two di erent keys to the same set of shares, S fxg, distributed to some quali ed subset). Hence, to construct a scheme for ?, we need a share set of size at least (w ? r)jKj + r.
Even though the conditions of Theorem 4.2 seem quite strict, for any access structure ?
there does exist a set B of participants satisfying them. In fact, it is su cient to take the set B as a non-quali ed set of maximum size. For threshold access structures, this yields the bound of Theorem 4.1. In the case of a graph access structure, the following corollary is obtained. Corollary 4.3 Let G be a graph on w vertices. Then, in any strict anonymous secret sharing scheme for G, with key set K, the size of the share set S satis es jSj (w ? (G))jKj + (G);
where (G) is stability number of G.
In general, given a graph G, we would want to nd a set B satisfying the conditions of Theorem 4.2 such that the bound is maximized. Hence, the size of such a set B should be minimized. The best choice for B is to take a minimum size independent set of G that is also a dominating set. We obtain the following.
Corollary 4.4 Let G be a graph on w vertices. Then, in any strict anonymous secret sharing scheme for G with key set K, the size of the share set S satis es jSj (w ? (G))jKj + (G);
where (G) is the minimum size of an independent set of G that is also a dominating set.
For general graphs, to compute the minimum size independent set that is also a dominating set is hard. Indeed, given an integer`and a graph G, to determine whether there exists a set V 0 2 V (G) of size`such that V 0 is both a dominating set and an independent set is an NP-complete problem (see 11]). However, for a particular class of graphs, we can compute easily such a set V 0 , and thus obtain an explicit bound.
Corollary 4.5 Let G = K w 1 ;w 2 ;:::;wt be a complete multipartite graph on w vertices such that w 1 w 2 w t . Then, in any strict anonymous secret sharing scheme for G with key set K, the size of the share set S satis es jSj (w ? w 1 )jKj + w 1 : Proof: For i = 1; 2; : : : ; t, let V i V (G) be the ith part of G, with jV i j = w i . It is easy to see that the set V 1 is the minimum size independent set of G that is also a dominating set.
Constructions for Anonymous Schemes
In this section we discuss brie y some simple constructions for anonymous schemes. Some of these constructions are modi cations of previously known constructions. As an illustration, we apply our constructions to access structures based on complete multipartite graphs.
First, we note that Brickell and Stinson 6] showed how to transform any secret sharing scheme for an access structure ? into a strict anonymous one. Theorem 5.1 Suppose that there exists a secret sharing scheme for access structure ?, having participant set P, key set K and share set S. Then there exists a strict anonymous scheme for access structure ?, having key set K and share set P S.
We now look at the concept of \splitting" an access structure, an idea introduced in the context of graph access structures in 6] (note also that splitting is a special case of \insertion" 17]). Suppose ? is an access structure for participant set P, and let : P ! Z + . For each P 2 P, let P 0 = fPg f1; : : : ; (P )g be a set of (P ) participants. Then de ne P 0 = P2P P 0 to be a new participant set. For each B 2 ?, and for each function : B ! Z + such that (P ) (P ) for every P 2 B, let B = f(P; (P )) : P 2 Bg. Take ? 0 to consist of all such sets B , B 2 ?. Then we say that ? 0 is obtained from ? by splitting.
The following theorem holds. In the case k = 2, this provides a scheme with q keys and q+1 shares for an access structure which is the closure of the edge set of a complete bipartite graph, but it is possible to do better using the Phillips-Phillips construction (Theorem 3.1).
In the case of a (2; w) threshold structure, we can construct an anonymous scheme having one more key than a strict anonymous scheme obtained from Theorem 5. Proof: If a resolvable Steiner system S(2; w; v) exists, then from Theorem 5.3 there exists a strict anonymous scheme with a key set of size (v ?1)=(w ?1) and a share set S of size v. Let F be the family of distribution rules of such a scheme. Let 1 6 2 K be a new key, and de ne F 1 = f(x; x; : : : ; x) : x 2 Sg. Consider the family F 0 = F F 1 . It is easy to check that F 0 constitutes a family of distribution rules for an anonymous secret sharing scheme for ? with a set of (v ? 1)=(w ? 1) + 1 keys having a share set S of size v.
Remark 5.1 The scheme presented in Example 2.1 for the (2; 3) threshold structure is based on the previous construction.
In the following theorem, we present a technique to obtain strict anonymous secret sharing schemes for access structures constructed by splitting. Theorem 5.6 Let ? be an access structure on a set P of participants, and suppose there exists a strict anonymous scheme for ? with a key set of size q and a share set of size v. Let ? 0 be the access structure obtained by splitting ? using the function . Denote T = maxf (P ) : P 2 Pg. Then there exists a strict anonymous scheme for ? 0 with a key set of size q and a share set of size vT.
Proof: Let F be the collection of distribution rules for the scheme realizing ?. Let S be the share set for the scheme F, and de ne S 0 = S fi : 1 i Tg. For every f 2 F, de ne a new distribution rule f 0 for the participants in P 0 by the rule f 0 (P; i) = (f(P ); i) for every P 2 P, 1 i (P ).
Again, we will apply this construction in the case of complete multipartite graphs.
Theorem 5.7 Let G = K w 1 ;w 2 ;:::;w k be a complete multipartite graph such that w 1 w 2 w k . Suppose there exist a resolvable Steiner system S(2; k; v). Then, there exists a strict anonymous secret sharing scheme for G with a set K of (v ? 1)=(k ? 1) keys, having a share set of size w k v.
If w 1 = w 2 = : : : = w k , then by Corollary 4.5 the scheme is optimal with respect to the size of the share set. For example, in the case k = 2, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5.8 Let G be a complete bipartite graph K w;w . Then there exists an optimal strict anonymous scheme for G for any set K of q 3 keys, q odd, having (q + 1)w possible shares.
